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Abstract. The last decade has witnessed rapid proliferation of cloud
computing. While even the smallest distributed programs (with 3-5 ac-
tions) produce many unanticipated error cases due to concurrency in-
volved, it seems short of a miracle these web-services are able to operate
at those vast scales. In this paper, we explore the factors that contribute
most to the high-availability of cloud computing services and examine
where self-stabilization could fit in that picture.
1 Introduction
The last decade has witnessed rapid proliferation of cloud computing. Internet-
scale webservices have been developed providing search services over billions of
webpages (such as Google and Bing), and providing social network applications
to billions of users (such as Facebook and Twitter). While even the smallest
distributed programs (with 3-5 actions) can produce many unanticipated error
cases due to concurrency involved, it seems short of a miracle that these web-
services are able to operate at those vast scales. These services have their share
of occasional mishap and downtimes, but overall they hold up really well.
In this paper, we try to answer what factors contribute most to the high-
availability of cloud computing services, what type of fault-tolerance and recov-
ery mechanisms are employed by the cloud computing systems, and whether
self-stabilization1 fits anywhere in that picture.
Self-stabilization had shown a lot of promise early on for being applicable in
the cloud computing domain. The CAP theorem2 seemed to motivate the need
for designing eventually-consistent systems for the cloud and self-stabilization
has been pointed out by experts as a promising direction towards developing
a cloud computing research agenda [9]. On the other hand, there has not been
many examples of stabilization in the clouds. For the last 6 years, the first author
has been thinking about writing a “Stabilization in the Clouds” position paper,
or even a survey when he thought there would surely be plenty of stabilizing
1 Stabilization [18,6] is a type of fault tolerance that advocates dealing with faults in
a principled unified manner instead of on a case by case basis: Instead of trying to
figure out how much faults can disrupt the system’s operation, stabilization assumes
arbitrary state corruption, which covers all possible worst-case collusions of faults
and program actions. Stabilization then advocates designing recovery actions that
takes the program back to invariant states starting from any arbitrary state.
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design examples in the cloud. However, this proved to be a tricky undertak-
ing. Discounting the design of eventually-consistent key-value stores [17] and
application of Conflict-free Replicated Data Types (CRDTs) [34] for replication
within key-value stores, the examples of self-stabilization in the cloud computing
domain have been overwhelmingly trivial.
We ascribe the reason self-stabilization has not been prominent in the cloud
to our observation that cloud computing systems use infrastructure support to
keep things simple and reduce the need for sophisticated design of fault-tolerance
mechanisms. In particular, we identify the following cloud design principles to be
the most important factors contributing to the high-availability of cloud services.
1. Keep the services “stateless” to avoid state corruption. By leverag-
ing on distributed stores for maintaining application data and on ZooKeeper [26]
for distributed coordination, the cloud computing systems keep the comput-
ing nodes almost stateless. Due to abundance of storage nodes, the key-value
stores [1] and databases [15,11] replicate the data multiple times and achieves
high-availability and fault-tolerance. In our earlier work [4], we explored how
distributed coordination is achieved in cloud computing, and found that an
overwhelming majority of cloud computing systems adopt coordination ser-
vices, such as ZooKeeper, for maintaining concurrency-critical state. 3
2. Design loosely coupled distributed services where nodes are dis-
pensable/substitutable. The service-oriented architecture [37], and the
RESTful APIs for composing microservices are very prevalent design pat-
terns for cloud computing systems, and they help facilitate the design of
loosely-coupled distributed services. This minimizes the footprint and com-
plexity of the global invariants maintained across nodes in the cloud com-
puting systems. Finally, the virtual computing abstractions, such as virtual
machines [36], containers [13], and lambda computing servers [7] help make
computing nodes easily restartable and substitutable for each other.
3. Leverage on low level infrastructure and sharding when building
applications. The low-level cloud computing infrastructure often contain
more interesting/critical invariants and thus they are designed by experi-
enced engineers, tested rigorously, and sometimes even formally verified [32].
Higher-level applications leverage on the low-level infrastructure, and avoid
complicated invariants as they resort to sharding at the object-level and
user-level [35]. Sharding reduces the atomicity of updates, but this level of
atomicity has been adequate for most webservices, such as social networks.
A common theme among these principles is that they keep the services sim-
ple, and trivially “stabilizing”, in the informal sense of the term. Does this mean
2 CAP theorem says that in the presence of a partition, it is impossible to have strong
consistency and high availability [10,20,21]. Since cloud computing systems value
high-availability (as they make money by being highly-available), weaker-consistency
models such as eventual-consistency became popular.
3 ZooKeeper is a Paxos replicated state machine implementation with a filesystem
API as the interface. It is used for keeping “metadata” safely and consistently to the
face of node failures, concurrency, and asynchrony.
that self-stabilization research is unwarranted for cloud computing systems? To
answer this, we point to some silver lining in the clouds for stabilization research.
We notice a trend that even at the application-level, the distributed systems soft-
ware starts to get more complicated/convoluted as services with more ambitious
coordination needs are being build.
In particular, we explore the opportunity of applying self-stabilization to
tame the complications that arise when composing multiple microservices to
provide higher-level services. This is getting more common with the increased
consumer demand for higher-level and more sophisticated web services. The
higher-level services are in effect implementing distributed transactions over
the federated microservices from multiple geodistributed vendors/parties, and
that makes them prone to state unsynchronization and corruption due to in-
complete/failed requests at some microservices. At the data processing systems
level, we also highlight a need for self-regulating and self-stabilizing design for
realtime stream processing systems, as these systems get more ambitious and
complicated as well.
Finally, we point out to a rift in the cloud computing fault model and recovery
techniques, which motivates the need for more sophisticated recovery techniques.
Traditionally the cloud computing model adopted the crash failure model, and
managed to confine the faults within this model. In the cloud, it was feasible to
use multiple nodes to redundantly store state, and easily substitute a stateless
worker with another one as nodes are abundant and dispensable. However, recent
surveys on the topic [29,23] remark that more complex faults are starting to
prevail in the clouds, and recovery techniques of restart, checkpoint-reset, and
devops involved rollback and recovery are becoming inadequate.
1.1 Outline of the rest of the paper
To illustrate how the three design principles above are embraced in cloud com-
puting systems, in Section 2 we present examples of services that power global-
scale operations of Google and Facebook, and then delve in to the architectures
of these services and their interactions with each other. We introduce the service-
oriented-architecture (SOA) design pattern popular in the cloud computing soft-
ware, and the microservices design pattern.
In Section 3, we review the literature on what types of faults occur in the
cloud computing systems and what type of fault-tolerance and recovery mecha-
nisms are employed to deal with these.
In Section 4, we point out to opportunities for applicability/adoption of self-
stabilization techniques in new emerging topics in cloud computing areas, includ-
ing in managing distributed coordination when composing multiple microser-
vices to form higher level services (in Section 4.1), in dealing with complicated
dataflow dependencies in realtime stream processing systems (in Section 4.2).
(a) (b)
Fig. 1: (a) Google and (b) Facebook software infrastructures (redrawn from [33])
2 Cloud Computing Design Principles
2.1 Cloud Software Infrastructure
Internet scale applications such as search engine and social network demand a
complicated software infrastructure with cluster management, data storage, data
processing, and application layers. Each layer usually contains multiple systems
to serve different use scenarios. Figures 1a and 1b illustrate the known systems
at Google and Facebook. The cluster management layer allocates hardware re-
sources and schedules jobs as a service provided to upper layers. Distributed
monitoring systems help system admins to keep cluster healthy. There are sev-
eral data storage systems that persist system state at scale and provide a rich
interface with various consistency guarantees. Data processing layer implements
required data analysis and representation for the applications.
Upon a closer examination, the distributed system within each layer often
adopts a simple architecture pattern where the master node maintains the crit-
ical states and workers accepts tasks from the master and compute on data
in a stateless manner. The master node relies on state-machine replication for
fault-tolerance. Finally, these systems often employ ZooKeeper for coordination
needs: including metadata management, group membership, leader election, and
resource and configuration management. Cloud applications typically leverage
such robust infrastructure for fault tolerance and recovery among other things.
2.2 Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) and Microservices
SOA is the most popular software design style in large-scale applications. In
SOA, the functionality is divided into isolated services and each service can use
other services through a communication protocol (e.g. RESTful) over a network.
Compared to the more traditional monolithic architecture pattern, the resulting
Fig. 2: Evolution of sharing (redrawn from [25])
microservices architecture pattern is more scalable through functional decompo-
sition.
Every microservice in the system is a simple, independent, distinct feature or
functionality of the application. Each service instance is typically a process run-
ning on its own VM or container. Each microservice instance maintains its own
state by using the data storage systems abundant in cloud computing infrastruc-
ture. The interconnected microservices exposes a well defined REST API that is
consumed by other services or clients. Representational state transfer (REST)
is the most common choice for inter-service communication because it makes
use of stateless protocol and standard operations (HTTP) for fast performance,
reliability and the ability to grow/update without affecting the running system
as a whole. Service API, therefore, is identified by its URL. Between any service
requests, the client context is not stored on the server providing the service. As
a result, each request from any client must contain all the information necessary
to serve the request.
2.3 Towards Stateless Computing
The infrastructure to support the cloud application has been rapidly evolving,
mostly in the opensource domain. The evolutionary trend is to increase the
flexibility of cloud infrastructure while reducing the overheads via virtualization
and resource sharing. Figure 2 compares these infrastructure approaches and
their shared layers in gray.
The development of virtualization technologies and increased efficiency of
Virtual Machines (VMs) gave rise to the proliferation of cloud computing appli-
cations. In the cloud, horizontal scalability is attained much easier by no longer
requiring physical hardware to support applications. Many systems are able to
run in virtual machines on the same hardware, making resource utilization higher
and favoring horizontal scalability over vertical. This allowed applications to have
smaller state and become more portable for the ease of quick deployment on new
virtual machines.
Containerized environments took the resource sharing beyond the hardware.
Containers are isolated application environments that share hardware and an
underlying operating system [13]. They are very lightweight and can be brought
up online or turned off in the matter of seconds. This demanded the applications
to be lightweight as well, and having large state became prohibitively expensive
due to the costs of recovering the state after container migration or restart.
Finally, serverless or lambda [7] computing allows multiple applications to
share not only the same operating system, but also the user-space libraries and
runtimes. With serverless computing, the applications are defined as a set of
functions or lambda-handlers that have access to some common data-store for
state. The functions themselves, however, do not carry any state from one ex-
ecution to another. Handlers are typically written in a portable, interpreted
languages such as JavaScript or Python. By sharing the runtime environment
across functions, the code specific to a particular application will typically be
small. The code size, portability and stateless nature of handlers make them
inexpensive to send to any worker in a cluster.
2.4 Coordination in the Cloud
Coordination plays an important role in the cloud applications, especially as
the complexity of the systems grows. In our recent work [4], we surveyed the
use of Paxos-like consensus systems used in various cloud computing systems.
We identified 9 distinct usecases for the coordination as illustrated in Figure 3.
The most common of these usecases are metadata management with 27% of the
usage scenarios surveyed, leader election (20%), group membership (11%), and
synchronization (11%).
Metadata management provides a mechanism for maintaining metadata, such
as configuration or state of shared objects, across the nodes in the cluster in a
consistent and fault-tolerant manner. The leader election usecase allows systems
to safely elect a single node acting as a dedicated master for some operations.
Synchronization is another important use case that enables distributed locks.
Other use cases for consensus systems in the cloud include server and log repli-
cation, barrier orchestration, service discovery and distributed queues.
3 Cloud Computing Faults and Recovery
3.1 Cloud Computing Faults
Failures in the cloud can be roughly categorized as small-scale faults and large-
scale failures. Small faults typically only impact a few clients or some specific
requests, allowing the system to process the rest of the workload. For instance,
an example of such small fault would be a rejected hotel booking request due
to the insufficient funds on the card. In this case, the fault does not have any
impact on other users or requests, yet the system has to take a corrective action
to make sure the room is not marked as reserved. The credit card failure left the
booking service in a corrupted state as the room was reserved without a payment.
However, this corruption is localized to a single service and not likely to spread
to other services, making the room unavailability to be the only adversarial effect
of the fault if left without a correction.
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Fig. 3: Consensus systems usage in the cloud (redrawn from [4])
Crash fault approach to fault tolerance is crucial to many of such small and
localized failures. If the node failure did not impact any global state of the
systems, such as persisting some corrupted data to storage, then a failure can
be dealt with a simple restart or provisioning of a new node. In some cases, even
if the failure is persisted to storage, it can be masked through replication and
redundancy in the cloud.
More intricate small-scale failures may corrupt a state in a way that al-
lows such corruption to propagate from one component to another. In such
non-localized corruption scenarios, correcting state is more difficult, since the
engineers need to account for the possibility of re-corruption cycles [28]. The
spread of corruption across the components of the cloud system can lead to a
catastrophic failure.
Large-scale failures are faults that leave the system unavailable for significant
number of users or requests. Gunawi et al. conducted a survey of catastrophic
failures across various cloud applications and identified the most common reasons
cloud systems crash [23] as illustrated in Table 1. According to their study
of 597 failure reports from different systems, only 15% of the failures are the
result of some bugs in the code, while another 10% are due to the problems in
configuration. Upgrade failures, which are bugs and misconfigurations introduced
during the system upgrade and maintenance account for another 16% of failures.
Table 1: Causes of Catastrophic Failures in the cloud [23]
Root Cause # of Services # of Occurances % of Occurances
Unknown 29 355 -
Upgrade 18 54 16
Network 21 52 15
Bugs 18 51 15
Misconfiguration 19 34 10
Traffic Load 18 31 9
Cross-Service Dependencies 14 28 8
Power Outages 11 21 6
Security Attacks 9 17 5
Other Human Errors 11 14 4
Storage Failure 4 13 4
Server Failure 6 11 3
Natural Disasters 5 9 3
Other Hardware Failures 4 5 1
Many of the other failures are subject to the external events, such as security
attacks, natural disasters or failure of outside dependencies
Cross-service dependencies are a special category of external failures origi-
nated at some service outside of the affected cloud system. These failures show
that a reliability of a cloud application depends not only on the reliability of
internal infrastructure and code, but also on the services external to the appli-
cation. This is especially important in the context of microservices architecture,
since a single unreliable microservice can cause cascading failures on its depen-
dents.
3.2 Recovery Models
Recovery by Waiting. Recovery by waiting is typically used in cases of outside
cross-service dependency failures [23]. In these situations, the cloud application
and infrastructure is capable of proper operation, but fails due to the unavail-
ability of an external service, and must wait for the outside resources to become
available again. As a remedy to the waiting for outside recovery, cloud applica-
tions need to design for redundancy on the external dependencies they use.
Recovery by Restart. Since many of the cloud components are either
stateless or have small state that can be quickly replicated and loaded to new
nodes, restarting the failed or slow nodes became a common practice in the cloud
systems. Cloud systems are carefully guarded against server failures, making
the recovery by restart an easy and safe option for handling many faults. This
led to the fact that many smaller scale problems, such as memory leaks or re-
optimizations done as a results of shifting workloads, are addressed by restarting
the nodes instead of fixing the code or introducing additional complexity to it [8].
Some cloud applications constantly induce server crashes in their infrastructure
to probe the system and make sure it can handle a larger-scale faults [12].
However, recovery by restart is not able to address all failures happening in
the cloud systems. Some failures are not caused by problems in the software,
while some more intricate problems may involve distributed state corruption
that can persist after individual node restarts.
Recovery by Checkpoint Reset. Checkpoint-reset is also a popular way to
bring the system back to the correct state after the fault. These type of recovery
causes the system to lose some progress and restart from some older known safe
checkpoint. Because of this drawback, this type of recovery cannot be used with
systems providing real-time feedback to the users. However, checkpoint-reset is
a popular approach for data-processing [16,31] and distributed machine learning
[2,39] applications.
Recovery by Application Rollback. Failures during the system upgrade
are the single largest cause of catastrophic failures in the cloud systems [23].
These failures often happen due to the bugs or misconfigurations introduced
with application upgrades. The natural way to remedy such faults is rolling
back to the previous stable version of the application and configuration.
Large applications, often perform gradual application upgrade or configura-
tion rollout to the production system to minimize the impact possible bugs may
bring to the systems. The idea is to catch the problem before it was deployed
full-scale, thus both minimizing the severity of problem and time to roll-back.
For instance, Facebook’s Configerator tool controls how new configurations roll-
out from testing to the production environment and how the new configuration
gradually expands to cover more production nodes [38]. Configerator monitors
the system behavior with every increase of new configuration’s coverage and
can automatically rollback to the previous good configuration if the problem is
detected during the rollout.
Recovery by State Repair. An application state can be corrupted due to
bugs in the code or configuration, however not every cloud application can toler-
ate being reset to a prior checkpoint or some predetermined safe state. For such
application, engineers must design a corrector [5] that fix the application state
when a corruption occurs. Many severe bugs are capable of corrupting the state
of the application. For instance, Leesatapornwongsa et al. compiled the database
of known distributed concurrency (DC) bugs, one of the most complicated bug
types in distributed systems from popular cloud-scale applications [29]. The au-
thors also analyzed the fixes that were devised to address these issues in the
code.
Many DC bugs in [29] were fixed in an offline manner by patching the code to
prevent the faulty execution from occurring, but some more intricate bugs could
not be addressed in such manner. Unlike the preventable bugs caused by bad
Fig. 4: An example of a monolithic hotel reservation service.
message timing or incorrect timing assumptions, the more difficult DC bugs were
caused by unfortunate and uncontrollable timing of the component failures in the
cloud applications. Instead, such bugs were fixed by adding a simple corrector
to the system that forward corrects the global state to a consistent state while
the system is running.
Offline Recovery. Many of the DC bug fixes mentioned earlier operated at
the code level, preventing the problem from occurring in the fixed version. These
fixes happen offline, as the application needs to go through a development cycle
of making a fix, testing and deployment. In other words, the engineers develop
the correctors in an ad-hoc manner on a case-by-case basis.
4 Future Directions for Stabilization in the Cloud
4.1 Distributed Coordination at Application Level
Cloud applications are often build on top of frameworks and architectures that
hide the complexity of distributed systems. For example, MapReduce provides
powerful batch-processing capabilities while keeping a simple API and allowing
the application developer to write code as if they were developing a single-
threaded application [16]. Distributed transactions accomplish similar goals, as
they allow developers to think of distributed and concurrent requests as sequen-
tial operations on a single machine.
A transaction updates the state of multiple remote nodes or components in
the cloud application in such a way that either all components are successful at
changing their state or none. For example, consider our earlier hotel reservation
application that perform multiple actions for the booking to be complete. The
application consists of a coordinator and two components: room reservation and
credit card processing, as shown in the Figure 4. With the help of transactions,
the application can tolerate component failures without the global state being
affected. For instance, if the room reservation component successfully marks the
room as reserved, but the credit card processing fails, then the system will abort
the transaction and no room-reservation will be preserved in the state of the
application. Traditionally, transactional systems [15,3] employ atomic commit
protocols, such as two-phase commit (2PC), to perform transactions. However,
2PC is regarded as slow protocol with a number of corner cases that affect its
performance and availability [14,11].
Fig. 5: An example of a micro-service hotel reservation system.
Transactions do not fit well in the geodistributed heterogenous cloud sys-
tems due to performance reasons [24]. Moreover, developers cannot always rely
on having a common coordination tool in microservice designs, because some
of the services may be external to the application and maintained by another
party. Returning to our hotel booking example, every component of the reser-
vation service had little knowledge of other components’ states, but at least
these components were part of the same infrastructure and could coordinate.
Now consider an example in which the hotel reservation system needs to inter-
act with different external booking microservices for each of the hotel brands,
as illustrated in Figure 5. An external microservice can mutate its own state,
such as booking a room or canceling the reservation, but it cannot participate
in the internal transactions, since the infrastructure and protocols to coordinate
between the microservices are lacking.
Despite the fact that transactional solutions do not work well with microser-
vices architectures especially in the presence of outside actors, we often need to
provide some of the transactional guarantees to such cloud systems. In particu-
lar, if one of the microservices in the request is not successful, we need to revert
the state of the microservices that have already changed their states. We illus-
trate this process in the Figure 6. These corrective actions are typically written
at the coordinator layer of the application in an ad-hoc manner and are not
enforced by some specialized protocol. With this corrective approach, engineers
need to provide undo-actions for the anticipated failures. For instance, if the
room booking micro-service has already reserved the room when the credit card
processing micro-service failed to charge the credit card, the coordinator needs to
issue a corrective action to the booking microservice and cancel the reservation
in order to bring the overall global system in a consistent state.
Self-stabilization can be useful in these scenarios, where distributed microser-
vices need to be coordinated and kept eventually consistent to the face of fail-
ures. On the other hand, in order to become applicable for large scale cloud
systems, self-stabilization methodology should allow certain compromises. For
instance, recovering to an approximate invariant can be supported. Another ex-
ample would be to design stabilization in a limited/specialized framework written
to handle distributed coordination, such as distributed sagas [30].
(a) (b)
Fig. 6: Hotel reservation example with corrective actions. (a) Credit card micro-
service is not successful at charging the card. (b) Correcting the state of room-
booking micro-service.
4.2 Stabilization in DataFlow Systems
Modern data-processing [31,27] and distributed machine learning systems [2]
often represent the computation as a graph with data flowing along the edges and
vertices representing the computations. These systems tend to utilize checkpoint-
reset as their failure recovery model, however this may be inadequate for online
stream processing systems, such as Twitters Heron [27]. Under checkpoint reset,
an online stream-processing system would lose all computations happening after
the checkpoint in case of a recovery. Heron runs on a large number of small-
state workers that receive their tasks from a centralized streaming manager and
utilizes recovery by restart model for many faults, as the small tasks can be
rescheduled to different workers as needed.
Dhalion is a system that aims to automate many of the actions undertaken
by Herons engineers for fault recovery and performance tuning [19]. Dhalion
achieves this through monitoring of many vital parameters and using the moni-
toring data to detect abnormalities in operation and come up with a set of pos-
sible causes for abnormal behavior. Dhalion uses the probable causes to identify
the best possible fix out of the ones available to it and apply that correction to
the systems, bringing it to a healthier state. The systems attempts to resolve the
problems at the higher, infrastructure level instead of the application-logic level.
For instance, if Dhalion detects the performance is inadequate, it will attempt
to scale up by adding more workers. Similarly, if Dhalion sees a faulty worker,
it will attempt moving the tasks away from that worker into a healthy one.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we presented the design principles that contribute most to the
high-availability of cloud computing services, and reviewed the type of fault-
tolerance and recovery mechanisms employed by the cloud computing systems.
We argued that since cloud computing systems use infrastructure support to
keep things simple and reduce the need for sophisticated design of fault-tolerance
mechanisms, self-stabilization has not been prominent in the cloud. Finally, we
identified recent trends in cloud computing that motivate the design of more so-
phisticated fault-tolerance mechanisms/frameworks, namely the implementation
of distributed coordination over microservices, the development of sophisticated
realtime dataflow processing systems, and the increased frequency of intricate
failures due to complicated interactions of services.
In order to adopt self-stabilization to address availability issues in cloud, we
believe that it is important to adhere to the simplicity and “infrastructure-first”
principles in the cloud computing systems. We anticipate that the resulting solu-
tions would make compromises to be “practically self-stabilizing”[6] rather than
“traditionally/formally self-stabilizing”. For example, while “arbitrary state cor-
ruption” model is interesting theoretically, it is infeasible to realize at the imple-
mentation level, and it is overkill in that the return on investment is unjustified.
We belive that there is a need to define restricted corruption models and healing
techniques that leverage existing cloud infrastructure. One may consider allowing
only noncritical variable corruption as in [22] by leveraging the cloud infrastruc-
ture (such as ZooKeeper and key-value stores) to protect precious variables. Or
an alternate model is to allow only specification/API-level variable corruption
(reasoning those are the state that matter) and deal with implementation state
corruption by leveraging cloud infrastructure.
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